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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ETHEL LOUISE GREGERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent, }

vs.

(

EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
A CORPORATION,
D·efenda;nt and Appellant.

C-ase

~v.

7674

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND BRIEF IN STJPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
The appellant, Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company, a corporation, petitions the court for a
rehearing and reargument of the above entitled case
upon the following grounds:
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF SOUND HEALTH WAS WAIVED AT THE
TIME OF ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY WHERE DEFENDANT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF FRAUDULENTLY CONCEALED FACTS, AND WHERE THE FACTS NEGATIVE
INTENT TO WAIVE THAT REQUIREMENT.
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POINT II.
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE EFFECT OF
BREACH OF WARRANTIES IN THE INSURANCE APPLICATION AS SUCH BREACH RELATES TO THE EXISTENCE
OF THE POLICY AND THE WAIVER RIDER, WHICH WAS
AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SAME.

WHEREFOR.E, petitioner prays that the judgment
and opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargument be
permitted of the entire case.
A 'brief in support of this Jletition is fHed here,vith.
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW,

VERL (_2TCHIE,
~
By ----------------- - - --- -------- - ----------------------- ---Attorneys for Appellant

V erl C. Ritchie hereby certifies that he is one of the
attorneys for appellant and petitioner herein and that,
in his opinion, there is good cause to believe that the
judgment and decision of the Court is erroneous and that
the case should be reheard and reargued as prayed for in
said petition.
Dated June r8,-~53.
-

----------___ v__ ----------------------------------------------------------- ----STATEMENT
Appellant fully appreciates the reluctance of this
Court to entertain a 1\fotion for Rehearing. We are firmly
convinced, however, that this decision, if permitted to
stand, will not only in effect overturn a long and well
established line of Utah authorities, but will tend to
distur'b and even de·stroy settled rules of applicable insurance laws which have long been accepted and acted
2
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upon by all insurance companies op·erating within the
State of Utah. For this reason \Ye 1nust evidence a deep
concern over the effect of the decision as 1nany contracts
of insurance which are outstanding and procedural
n1ethods of underwriting 'vill be seriously and adversely
affected.
rrhe opinion would seem to wholly disregard the
effect of breach of warranties contained in a policy ap~
plication, where no medical examination is required. As
a practical1natter, there are many instances where insurance con1panies have been willing to issue such policies
upon the assumption that they are protected in so doing
against the deceit and misrepTesentation of the applicant.
If the ability of insurance co1npanies to rely upon such
representations and warranties is, in effect, destroyed, it
\vill undoubtedly be necessary to require in each instance
of policy issuance a detailed and far-reaching medical
examination which is both costly and burdensome, and
which will in ultimate effect react to the detriment of the
public generally.
The opinion states that the 'basic and decisive issue
in this case is whether or not defendant herein waived
the right to insist up·on compliance with the requirement
of a showing by the insured of physical insurability before granting a pToper request for reinstatement. In
considering such is.sue, however, the opinion basically
is concerned with an interpretation of the policy terms,
and the relation between what might be described as the
base policy and the waiver rider aspects of the policy.
The position of app·ellant, which we believe the· Court

3
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has either misconstrued or overlooked, is that the effect
of the breach of warranty is to destroy the policy from
its beginning, and with it the basic premise upon which
any waiver could he 'based, since that waiver was attached to the policy at the time of issuance and an
integral part of the same. In addition to this, the opinion
seems to also overlook the fact that no waiver could
possibly have been made without the intentional relinquishment of known rights, and to allow recovery where
the very premise of waiver is destroyed, since the appellant had no knowledge of the breach of warranties and
misrepresentations of assured and was, therefore, wholly
ignorant of its rights to refuse the issuance of the policy.
We believe the issues in this case can be very simply
stated as to whether an insured, who wilfully and knowingly conceals a seTious and farreaching illness so mateTially increasing the risk that the policy never would have
been issued had this condition been known, may be permitted to.take advantage of his own conduct.
There is no question as to the applicable facts, particularly with reference to breach of wararnty. On
May 23, 1947, Dr. Grant Gregerson made a \vritten application to the Mountain States Insurance Co1npany for
a membership policy. This application, whose factual
statements were warranties and not representations, contained ce·rtain statements of the Doctor relative to his
state of he~alth at the time. He stated. that he was in ·
good health and had suffered no prior serious illness and
that he had· had no heart or circulatory disease. In fact,
the evidence is clear that from April 27 to May 11, 1946,
4
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the assured was hospitalized with a serious cardiac failure and hypertention and that these conditions existed
at the time application was n1ade.
Based up·on such application and the warranties con..,
tained therein, the appellant issued a policy of insurance.
This policy consisted not only of what might he termed
a standard form, but, as integral parts, the application
and a rider designated as a waiver. It is the position of
the appellant that, in view of the undisp·uted breach of
warranty on the part of the assured .and of the statements in the application, that if there he misrepresentations or untrue statements therein, there is a complete
forfeiture of any benefits, the appellant had the right to
cancel the policy, including both the base p·olicy and the
,Naiver rider. There is no other premise upon which can
be based the action of the Comp~any in demanding· and
receiving this application, and it becomes in reality a
condition prece·dent to the effective existence of either
the waiver or the base policy.
For this reason we say that the net effect of this
decision is to permit an assured to knowingly and falsely
conceal a true state of health as to matters directly and
materially affecting the risk and to permit a beneficiary
thereafter to recover for death resulting from the very
physical disability which had heen misrepresented and
which constituted a breach of warranty.
Our principal coneern lies in the fact that the Court,
in its decision, literally ignores the question of warranty,
and treats the application and its effectiveness as nonexistent, notwithstanding that that application was the
5
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very premise upon which the policy was issued. For this
reason we say that the Court has thereby directly attacked
a long line of decisions of Utah courts relative to the
effective force of a breaeh of warranty, and, by this
decision, has created a state of confusion in regard to
warranties in insurance law in the State of Utah.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF SOUND HEALTH WAS WAIVED AT THE
TIME OF ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY WHERE DEFENDANT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF FRAUDULENTLY CONCEALED FACTS, AND WHERE THE FACTS NEGATIVE
INTENT TO WAIVE THAT REQUIREMENT.

The net result of the decision is to hold that defendant has waived all rights to rely on the defense of breach
of warranty. rt is perfectly clear in the record that there
was such a breach of warranty in concealing and failing
to state a serious cardiac ailment, and that such Inisstatement was material to the risk.
The appellant had no knowledge of these fradulent
state·ments contained in the ap·plication, nor does the
respondent claim in any way that this knowledge was
possessed by appellant.. We, therefore, submit that, in
practical effect, there was no effective policy or waive-r,
and that under the terms of the application the company
has the right to decline any payments upon surrender of
premiums which had been paid.
If it be contended that the application was, in effect,
destroyed by the waiver, which to us is an incredible con6
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tention, the fact still ren1a1ns that a wa1ver cannot
be effectively made unless the party so waiving is advised of the underlying facts at the time of the waiver
and of the existence of a right to forfeit the policy.
That a 'vaiver is effective only when it is intentionally made and 'vith kno,vledge of the circumstances has
been 'veil settled in l 1 tah for Inany years. Re: Auerbach
Estate, 23 Utah 529; Reed v. Union Life Insurance, 21
Utah 295, 61 Pac. 21; Phoenix Insurance Comparny v.
Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 Pa.c. (2d) 308.
Waiver is universally defined as "an intentional
abandonment or relinquishment of a known right." See
Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed.
Since appellant was ignorant of the facts that insured was actually in serious physical condition, it cannot be said to have waived such condition at the time of
issuance of the policy. In the case of Reed vs. U1iion Life
Instttrance, supra, the court stated at page 309 of Vol. 21
of the Utah Reports :
"The question of the plaintiff's knowledege or
ignorance in the matter is involved. If the plaintiff was ignorant of the fact that he was entitled
to his commission at the time and after the defendant purehased the surrender of the poliey·,
and did not intentionally waive his right therein
after full knowledge, he was entitled to recover.
This is so because a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, and there must be
both knowledge of the existence of the right and
an intention to relinquish it. The waiver, if any,
was a question of intent on the part of the plaintiff. Knowledge of the rights he had, and an
intention to waive such rights should be made

7
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such a case as this, he justified in declaring it."
plainly to appear before a court or jury ·would, in
The ne·ce1ssity of knowledge of breach in an insurance
policy before the law of waiver can be invoked is well
stated in Vol. 16, Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice,
Sec. 9086, page~ 616, as follorws:
"It must ordinarily be shown, therefore, that
the insurer had knowledge of the facts constituting a breach of forfeiture, and that there wa.1
some unequivocal act of the insurer recognizing
the continuance of the policy or which was wholly
inconsistent with a forfeiture. Such knowledge
must be shown if negotiations with the insured
are made the basis of a waiver. * * *

"* * * The

insure~r's

notice of kno,vledge of
the falsity o.f an insured's representation in an
application for a life policy must be as broad,
comprehensive, and extensive as the representation and extended to s·o much thereof as is material
in order to waive its right to forfeit the policy for
such misrepresentation."
Appleman, Sec. 9085, sets out restrictions on construction of waivers as foHows:
"In insurance law, to constitute a waiver~
there must he an actual intention to relinquish an
existing right, benefit, or advantage, with knowledge, either actual or constructive, of its existence, or such conduct as to warrant an inference
of such intention to relinquish."
Inasmuch as a waiver is largely a question of intent,
.an intention to waive the rights must appear, as well as
a knowledge of the facts, before the Court is justified in declaring suC'h a 'va1ver. See Reed vs. Union

8
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Life Insu.rance, supra.. The fact that an application in
lieu of the physical exa1nina.tion by a physician was
required 'before the application could be acted upon is
entirely inconsistent 'vith the intent to "\Vaive this requirement at the time of the issuance of the policy. When
the terms of the application, as well as the p·rovisions in
the policy are construed as a whole, it cannot be said
that this requirement was waived. If the requirement
was 1caived, why then, did app·ellant insist upon the
completion of the application before the policy issued?
The Court, in its decision app~arently fails to consider the fact that a new and different type policy vva~
issued upon the life of Dr. Gregerson. That a prior
policy had b-een in effect on assured's- life. is of no consequence, although the Court app·arently was of the
opinion that such fact was of some importance. In the
case of Kelly vs. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
38 A. 2d 176, 131 Conn. 106, it was held that an insurer
was not estopped from asserting that the assured was
not in good health a:t the time the policy was issued as
required, merely because the policy was issued upon the
surrender of an _earlier policy, p·articularly where there
was no fraud on the· p·art of the insurer.
Indeed, the requirement of knowledge as an element
.of waiver applies with much greater force when the
insurer is ignorant of the forfeiture and the misstatements which cause it. It is clear that there can be no
-\vaiver irnplied under these circumstances. See Planter's
Mutual Inc. Co. vs. Loyd:, 67 Ark. 588, 56 S.W. 45; Bull vs.
Jf etropolitan Life Insurance Co., 12 S.E. 2d 24, 195 s.·c.
9
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536; and Guenther vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., ~{o.
App., 189 S.W. 2d 12.
Nor can the doctrine of estoppel be· invoked against
the defendant, when it was not aware of the misstatements of assured. See Ballard vs. Beneficial Life Ins. Co.,
82 Utah 1, 21 Pac. 2d 84 7, at page 26 of Vol. 83 Utah Reports, wherein the Court quotes at length from "Glob ..
Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Wolff, 95 U.S. 326, 333, 24 L. Ed.
387. The language is particularly apropros in view of
the Court's decision:
"The holder of the policy cannot be permitted
to conceal from the company an important fact,
like that of the insured being in extremis, and then
to claim a waiver of the forfeiture created by the
act which brought the insured to tha;t condition.
To permit such concealment, and yet to give to
the action of the comparny the same effect as
though no concealment were made, would tend to
sanction a fraud on the part of the policyholder,
instead of protecting him against the comntission
of one by the company." (Italics ours)
By its decision the Court condones the concealme:nt of
important and material facts by assured, when a;bsolute
good faith was required on his part. The. decision minimizes the importance of the false statments of warranties
in the application. Whether the policy would he issued
was dependent on the ans-\vers to the statements, and the
policy was issued on the assumption that the answers
were true. S-ee Braddock, by Smith. vs. Pacific Woodmen
Life Association, 89 Utah 75, 54 Pa.c. 2d 1189.
The case of Eklund vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 89 Utah 273, 57 P. 2d 362, involves a suit on certain

10
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so-called •'ind11strial policies." 11 he insuranet~ co1np~any
contended, a1nong other things, that there was a breach
of warranty in the applications and fraud in procuring
the polieies. Under facts soine\Yhat sin1ilar to the presenc
case, the Court held that the nlisstatements by the assured rendered the policies void, stating at page 282,
\ . .ol. S9 of the Utal1 Reports:
··* * * In the applications for insurance, as
heretofore set out, the assured stated that she
had neYer been tmder treatn1ent in any hospital;
that she had not been under the care of any physician within three years; she declared that these
staten1ents \Yere true and complete and that any
misrepresentation would render the policy void.
rrhese statements wer·e false. Her application for
the first policy was made November 2, 1933, less
than a 1nonth after the last date she had been
treated by Dr. Quick. The application for the
second policy was made the 31st of January, 1934,
two days after assured had been treated by Dr.
Taufer at the Salt Lake General Hospital. The
statements which the assured made were mater~ial
to the risk. The policies were issued without an.y
physical examina.tion of the assured. Whether
the cornpany would ·issue the policies was dependent upon the answers of the assured. The utmost
good faith to answer truthfully was required of
her. On the assumption tha.t the statements i.n
the applications were tru-e, the policies 1Dere
issued. By making the false representations,
\Vhieh the assured did, the comp~any was misled
to its prejudice. Whether we class the statements.
u1ade by the assured as representations or warranties, the same result is reached so far as the
facts of this case are concerned. If a representation is material to the risk and likewise knowingly
1

11
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false, it will be as potent for a rescission of the
contract embodied in the policy as if th.e untrue
statement was made iu form a warranty." (Italics
ours)

The analogy between the Eklund case and the present case shows the importance with which certain of
the facts were treated in that case. It can only be concluded that the court has overlooked such facts in reach
ing its decision.
· Respondent, in her original brief, lays considerable
stress upon the fact that no physical examination was
required prior to the effective date of the policy, and
claims that the p~enalty waived was the lirubility to take
a· physical examination and to "be free from all bodily
ailments and disease·" at the date of the policy or its reinstatement. See pages 2 and 3 of respondent's brief.
True, no physical examination was required of insured,
but in the alternative, a signed application was required
of him, and upon the assumption that the staten1ents in
the ,application were true, the policy was issued. That
the signed application was required clearly negatives
any showing of intent on the part of the defendant
to waive of the requirement of sound health at the time
of issuance of the policy. Even if it could be said that
there was a waiver of the reinstatement requirements,
this definite manifestation -of intent not to waive· the requirement of good health at the time of issuance and delivery of the policy, which includes the waiver ride·r cannot be overlooked.
Certainly to regard the application as immaterial

12
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would be to disregard a basic stipulation of the parties,
and the fact that such an application was required is
inconsistent "ith the theory that there was a waiver of
sound health, particularly at the time of issuance of the
policy. It must be borne in n1ind that the application
signed by the assured was as much a part of the contract
as the waiYer provisions. The company w-ould not have
issued the policy or signed the waiver but for the false
and fra.udulent statenzents of assured.
It does not follow that a "\vaiver of proof of insurability at the time of reinstatement is a waiver of requirement of good health at the time of the issuance of the
policy as the decision indicates. In the case of Planters
Mutual Insurance Compa1~y vs. Lloyd, supra, the Court
states the general rule in this regard. We quote from
page 47 of Vol. 56 SW:
"But if at the time of such negotiations the
insurer is ignorant of the forfeiture, and of the
misstatement which causes it, no waiver can be
implied. Nor will an act which impliedly waives
one ground of forefeiture affect . another forfeiture of "\Vhich the company and its agent were ·
ignorant.''
It is respectfully urged that the Court erred in holding that the appellant had waived its rights relating to
physical condition under the undisputed facts of this
case.

POINT II.
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE EFFECT OF
BREACH OF WARRANTIES IN THE INSURANCE APPLITION AS SUCH BREACH RELATES TO THE EXISTENCE

13
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OF THE POLICY AND THE WAIVER RIDER, WHICH WAS
AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SAME.

In this case, at the time this waiver was executed,
Appellant was relying, as it had a right to rely, upon the
affirmative representations and warranties of the application; and it had neither knowledge nor any facts which
would cause it to believe that these representations were
false. As a practical matter, it was not until the clain1
was made and the investigation relative thereto undertaken that what can only he de:scri!bed as the cupidity
of the assured was ap·parent. Our concern lies with the
fact that the court has completely ignored the effect of
this breach of warranties, which beco1nes in reality the
decisive issue in this case.
The application, on its face, immediately above the
signature of the applicant, affirmatively states as
follows:
"and that any concealments, Inisrepresentations
or untrue staten1ents herein or if I am not alive
and in good health at the time of the acceptance
and delivery of the policy based hereon, or at the
time of any reinstatement after a lapse thereof,
hereby forfeit any benefits under any policy that
n1ay be issued and hereby authorize the Secretary
or President to cancel this policy."
In net effect, this simply 1neans that the effective
existence of the policy, and the included waiver, depended
upon the truth of the representation of good health. It
is our firm conviction that by virtue of such breach of
warranty the company retained the right to cancel the
waiver and all the policy at any time of discovery of the
falsehoods.

14
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It is a basic and fundrunental rule that it is competent for the parties to provide under what conditions
and at \vhat time the policy should be effective. A summary of this rule as it relates to the requirment of sound
health was stated by Justice Thurman in the case of
White v. J.lletropolitan Life Insuran-ce Co., 63 Utah 272,
22± Pac. 1106, at page 282 of 63 Utah Reports, as follows:
UMany life insurance companies, as \Vill appear from a review of the cases cited, protect
the1nselves by a clause in the application or policy
to the effect that the insurance is not effective
unless the insured is in good health when the
policy should be delivered. As before stated these
provisions are al \va.ys upheld by the courts."
(Italics ours)
In this case the parties agreed, as it was compet~nt
for them to do, that the statements made 'hy assured constituted warranties. One year prior to the application
the assured had been hospitalized and treated for cardiac failure and hypertension. The evidence is uncontradicted that at the time of the application the assured was
in ill health and that his ailments seriously enhanced the
risk of death and were material to the risk.
It has long been held in Utah that the very existence
of an insurance contract of this nature depends upon the
truth of the statements of warranties. The general rule
is quoted by the Court in the case of Braddock by Smith
vs. Pacific Woodmen Life Association, supra, at page 81
of Vol. 89 Utah Reports :
"A warranty in the law of insurance consists
of a statement by insured upon the literal truth
of which the validity of the contract depends."

15
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The assured, by violation of the terms of the application, forfeited any rights he might have had under the
policy, and his beneficiary is not entitled to any more
rights in the contract than the assured 1night have had if
he were still living. If assured's rights had been forfeited, there would he no contract. Accordingly, there
could be no waiver of terms of a contract which did not
exist. The rule in this regard is well settled and was
stated by this Court in the case of Jones vs. New York
Life Insurarnce Company,.69 Utah 172,253 Pac. 200. We
quote from page 179 of Vol. 69, Utah Reports:
"The doctrine of waiver is hardly applicable
to the facts here. The theory of the waiver of the
terms of a contract. must necessarily presuppose
the existence· of a valid contract. Unless and
until a con tract exists between the contracting
parties it would seem to be illogical to contend
that either party can be said to have waived any
of the terms or requirements of the contract."
This proposition and the law of warranties is so
well settled that further citation of authority is unnecessary.
Appellant therefore asserts that by virtue of the
breach of warranties contained in the application, the
effective existence of both the poJicy and the included
wa1ver was forfeited. Since the opinion of the Court
has, in practical effect, overlooked this, not only as a
matter of refe·rence in the op~inion but as a basis of decision, it is respectfully urged that the case should be
reconsidered.

IG
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully
submits that the decision
not only reaches an erroneous
.
conclusion in the instant case, but if allowed to stand will
create substantial confusion in Utah law relating to the
effect of breach of warranty on insurance contracts, and
will directly affect the continued validity of a long line of
established Utah cases.
Appellant most earnestly submits that the decision
should be recalled and a hearing and reargument granted.
.

Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW,
VERL C. RITC-HIE,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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